Invasion of Ukraine: why so many Russian generals die

Another Russian general, Lieutenant General Andrei Mordvichev, was reportedly killed by Ukrainian forces in a conflict that is less than a month old. Mordvichev's death was announced on Ukrainian social media on March 20, 2022, but has not yet been confirmed by the Kremlin. His death, if confirmed, will bring to five the number of Russian generals killed by the Ukrainian armed forces since the war began.

The role of an army general is to command and supervise the strategy, rather than to carry out tactical actions on the ground. Therefore, casualties in this range have tended to be low. If you compare this figure of five deaths reported in less than a month with the total number of US generals killed between 1965 and 1975 in Vietnam - only 12 - you have to wonder why so many Russian generals are dying.

The attack on Russian high ground commanders is most likely part of a broader Ukrainian strategy to disrupt the command and control network of its enemies. Ukrainian forces are aware of the leadership approach that the Russian armed forces have adopted since 2001, based largely on international analyses carried out by US agencies and NATO. Its rigid hierarchical system, overseen by an autocratic leader in Vladimir Putin, condemns the lower ranks to a term of perpetual fear, with little room for independent thinking or decision-making.

Putin manages the army in the same way as he does with the Russian state in general, choosing loyalty to him over professional competence. The election of Sergei Shoigu as Russian Defense Minister in 2012 is a clear example of this. With no military experience or knowledge, Shoigu was chosen because he posed a small political threat to Putin or to the established military tradition. It has been criticized by many for failing to introduce major reforms following the Georgian campaign in 2008, which revealed key failures in the Russian army in carrying out combat operations.

Corruption in the Russian army

Corruption is endemic in all aspects of Russian life, including the army. A recent report, published in the framework of the London-based International Government Defence Integrity Index, noted that the Russian military was at high risk of corruption “due to extremely limited external oversight of defence institutions' policies, budgets, activities and acquisitions.” The report also highlighted the lack of transparency in procurement and the award of defence contracts, with a rating of only 36 out of 100 in this category. Loyalty to Putin may have made senior officials take a place in the inner circle, but it has been at the expense of the staff they serve.

The public procurement sector often brings opportunities for corrupt practices, and this is no different in the Russian State. A report published by the Risk and Compliance Portal (2021), which examines corrupt practices in States, states: “Bribes, bribes and other irregular payments are often exchanged to obtain public contracts. Companies denounce favoritism in officials' decisions, and public funds are often diverted due to corruption.”

The report also states that military contracts are more likely to receive approval not because of the quality or the level of supply, but because of the company's personal relations with State officials and its loyalty to the Kremlin.

The military reforms of the last decade have failed to impose a clear program of development and, instead, have allowed many of its military units to be low-ranking and poorly trained. A recent assessment by US Defense Intelligence suggested that Russian forces had sold much of the best equipment during the first months of their deployment to the Ukrainian border in 2021, due to poor conditions and wages.

On average, lower-ranking Russian professional soldiers earn $480 a month, while their equivalents in the Ukrainian army receive three times that figure. The division between pay, working conditions and morals could play an important role in determining the outcome of this conflict.

Targets

It is true that the high commanders have always been exposed to becoming targets on the battlefield, something that the Red Army used to a devastating effect on the ruins of Stalingrad in 1942, where Soviet snipers targeted both the lower and higher ranks. However, what differs between this conflict and those fought in the past is the proximity to the front line on which Russian generals appear to operate.

The lack of confidence they have in their lines of communication and at the level of ground commanders — a result of chronic levels of corruption — is providing clear opportunities for the Ukrainian military to beat up the few competent military leaders.

In Stalingrad, the commanding Wehrmacht officer, General Friedrich Paulus, was at least 15 miles from the city during the battle. This ensured that he and his staff maintained a broader strategic vision, placing confidence in their lower ranks rather than exposing themselves or his command team to tactical decision-making.

Ukraine has several well-equipped combat units that would be able to carry out specialized missions, so it seems that any opportunity could be taken to launch a direct attack on the generals, designed to disrupt the lines of communication, cause confusion and further slow down the Russian advance.

It is also hugely symbolic and provides a clear example to Russian bases that their enemies can easily target high commanders, demonstrating a failure of the system to protect their senior staff. It is a clear symbol of a weak and incompetent communication system that is forcing generals to move from strategic to tactical decision-making.

This causes distrust in the effectiveness of chains of command, and doubt spreads much faster than conviction. Meanwhile, the slower the progress, the longer the Ukrainian command will have to prepare its population centers for the advancement of enemy forces.

*Jonathan Jackson is a professor at the School of Social Sciences at Birmingham City University

KEEP READING: